Is freewill the cunning liberty of determination?

[ollypenrice]

Qualia's question from another thread. This is really interesting.  I find it hard to believe that past-present-future is an adequate theory of time. It violates the Copernican principle, for one thing, in that it puts us in a special position. This special position is what we call 'the present.' It is only in the present that we can excercise free will. We can't change the past or the future but only the present, we think. (Changes in the present will affect the future but they cannot be made in the future. You cannot turn the steering wheel tomorrow, you can only turn it now.)

If past-present-future is not comprehensively true but is only a local-to-us phenomenon, then where does that leave free will? On the face of it it leaves it dead in the water, but what if a wider dimensional matrix than that implied by past-present-future is somehow made up with free will in its recipe?

Olly

[JB80]

Well to say I'm confused and intrigued is probably a good call and having missed Qualias original post doesn't help.

Also I have just finished reading a chapter on determinism which neither makes me an expert or informed but my understanding is currently the argument for determinism is not an easy one to make due to things like Heisenbergs uncertainty principle, entanglement, superpositions and the failure of Bells Inequality experiments that are a body blow to determinism.

With that in mind I'm not sure how that relates or if it even does to the question you posed Olly.

It's not just a matter of interpretation is it?

[ollypenrice]

Well to say I'm confused and intrigued is probably a good call and having missed Qualias original post doesn't help.

Also I have just finished reading a chapter on determinism which neither makes me an expert or informed but my understanding is currently the argument for determinism is not an easy one to make due to things like Heisenbergs uncertainty principle, entanglement, superpositions and the failure of Bells Inequality experiments that are a body blow to determinism.

With that in mind I'm not sure how that relates or if it even does to the question you posed Olly.

It's not just a matter of interpretation is it?

Sounds like a good read you're having. Is it something approachable?

Olly

[JB80]

I think it's approachable, it's definitely aimed more towards the beginner and out of the 3 or so similarly aimed books I have read it's by far my favourite. It's by Jim Al-Khalili and maybe it's just his narrative I find easier but more seems to sink in from this book than the others.

http://www.amazon.co.uk/s/ref=nb_sb_noss?url=search-alias%3Daps&field-keywords=quantam+a+guide+for+the+perplexed

[Qualia]

I'm not sure how the following will contribute to the OP set up by Olly, but I hope it adds to the discussion and will give some idea of where the question arose.

If determinism is so then each state of affairs is necessitated by the states of affairs that preceded it. A basic assumption of this determinism (which is embedded in science) is that the future can be predicted and, in this way, determinism can be understood as an extension of cause and effect. If determinism is true and everything that happens is determined by the past, including events that preceded our birth, then every choice we make would ultimately be determined by events that were outside our control.

As JB80 has alluded to, free-will is not only incompatible with determinism but also indeterminism (the principle of uncaused events), for in both cases, every choice we make is ultimately originating from events outside our control. Owing to the impossibility of free-will in not only a deterministic and indeterminist world, but also in a world of their amalgamation, free-will must be non-existent in all possible worlds conceived. In all cases you cannot be the ultimate cause of the state of mind you are in because the only way to do that would be to exist before you existed - which I think is what Olly is referring to here.

The principle of free-will requires that you are ultimately responsible for this ultimate state of mind. But unless we can imagine a state of affairs that is neither deterministic or indeterministic and neither a bit of both, free-will is necessarily non-existent, as with the existence of round squares or carnivorous vegetarians.

The statement; Everything has a cause (determinism), or some things do not have a cause (indeterminism) (P or not P) is mutually exclusive, which means that one of the propositions is true. Because this statement also allows for no other statement to contradict it, it is also jointly exhaustive, which means that one of the statements must be true. This kind of statement is known as a contradictory.

Now, in reference to free-will it implies that in either case, the existence of these two worlds are incompatible with free-will. Free-will cannot exist in either state of affairs, nor within their amalgamation, for, as indicated, we cannot be morally accountable for the caused or uncaused events in force before our existence. So, again, unless we change our meaning, the principle of free-will seems to be a contradictory definition, and cannot exist as an ontological concept. The future, whatever it is, is fixed by past truths, those true propositions about the future.

[MrFinster]

I'm not sure how the following will contribute to the OP set up by Olly, but I hope it adds to the discussion and will give some idea of where the question arose.

If determinism is so then each state of affairs is necessitated by the states of affairs that preceded it. A basic assumption of this determinism (which is embedded in science) is that the future can be predicted and, in this way, determinism can be understood as an extension of cause and effect. If determinism is true and everything that happens is determined by the past, including events that preceded our birth, then every choice we make would ultimately be determined by events that were outside our control.

As JB80 has alluded to, free-will is not only incompatible with determinism but also indeterminism (the principle of uncaused events), for in both cases, every choice we make is ultimately originating from events outside our control. Owing to the impossibility of free-will in not only a deterministic and indeterminist world, but also in a world of their amalgamation, free-will must be non-existent in all possible worlds conceived. In all cases you cannot be the ultimate cause of the state of mind you are in because the only way to do that would be to exist before you existed - which I think is what Olly is referring to here.

The principle of free-will requires that you are ultimately responsible for this ultimate state of mind. But unless we can imagine a state of affairs that is neither deterministic or indeterministic and neither a bit of both, free-will is necessarily non-existent, as with the existence of round squares or carnivorous vegetarians.

The statement; Everything has a cause (determinism), or some things do not have a cause (indeterminism) (P or not P) is mutually exclusive, which means that one of the propositions is true. Because this statement also allows for no other statement to contradict it, it is also jointly exhaustive, which means that one of the statements must be true. This kind of statement is known as a contradictory.

Now, in reference to free-will it implies that in either case, the existence of these two worlds are incompatible with free-will. Free-will cannot exist in either state of affairs, nor within their amalgamation, for, as indicated, we cannot be morally accountable for the caused or uncaused events in force before our existence. So, again, unless we change our meaning, the principle of free-will seems to be a contradictory definition, and cannot exist as an ontological concept. The future, whatever it is, is fixed by past truths, those true propositions about the future.

To stick my 2 pennorth in, personally I agree that free will is illogical in a present that is a purely a consequence of prior actions, however this is not entirely true when it comes to making a choice.

The problem is rationalising the difference between choosing a course of action or deciding on a course of action. The latter is based upon reasons due to influences from past or current experience or knowledge and therefore shows a lack of free will.

A true choice has no reasoning behind it therefore it could be argued that the act of taking a course of action based on no reason is actually the definition of free will.

[foundaplanet]

To stick my 2 pennorth in, personally I agree that free will is illogical in a present that is a purely a consequence of prior actions, however this is not entirely true when it comes to making a choice.

The problem is rationalising the difference between choosing a course of action or deciding on a course of action. The latter is based upon reasons due to influences from past or current experience or knowledge and therefore shows a lack of free will.

A true choice has no reasoning behind it therefore it could be argued that the act of taking a course of action based on no reason is actually the definition of free will.

Hmm, Is that not just a confident intuitive instinctive reaction avoiding the thought process... Still a result of ones past experiences.

[Watchman]

You can look at the potential lack of free will two ways, A: we dont have free will so [removed word] it all, dont bother with anything coz it wont matter anyway..then blame fate. Or B: We dont have free will so it doesnt matter if we fail or succeed, so try as hard as you can since that is clearly what was set for the future anyway.

I prefer plan B

Or to quote a (I think) military man from some time in the fairly recent past: "I do not believe the future is set for a man who acts, but I absolutely believe it is set for the man who fails act" Or something similar to that anyway

[foundaplanet]

You can look at the potential lack of free will two ways, A: we dont have free will so [removed word] it all, dont bother with anything coz it wont matter anyway..then blame fate. Or B: We dont have free will so it doesnt matter if we fail or succeed, so try as hard as you can since that is clearly what was set for the future anyway.

I prefer plan B

Or to quote a (I think) military man from some time in the fairly recent past: "I do not believe the future is set for a man who acts, but I absolutely believe it is set for the man who fails act" Or something similar to that anyway

When it comes down to it there are thinkers and there are doers..

[foundaplanet]

Qualia's question from another thread. This is really interesting.  I find it hard to believe that past-present-future is an adequate theory of time. It violates the Copernican principle, for one thing, in that it puts us in a special position. This special position is what we call 'the present.' It is only in the present that we can excercise free will. We can't change the past or the future but only the present, we think. (Changes in the present will affect the future but they cannot be made in the future. You cannot turn the steering wheel tomorrow, you can only turn it now.)

If past-present-future is not comprehensively true but is only a local-to-us phenomenon, then where does that leave free will? On the face of it it leaves it dead in the water, but what if a wider dimensional matrix than that implied by past-present-future is somehow made up with free will in its recipe?

Olly

Then there will be a great deal of you's and I's exploring all plausible eventualities. For me, if freewill actually exists then consciousness is a real as the photons.

As for the past, present and future being the way that we are told is the structure of time.... I don't know why it is taking so long to figure out that everything which ever was, is, or will be is all of the time... It'll all come down to a big bag of vibrations that form illusions or music and frequencies.... This universe is how we see it, ha, pull the other one that is nothing short of silly isn't it..

[Qualia]

You can look at the potential lack of free will two ways, A: we dont have free will so [removed word] it all, dont bother with anything coz it wont matter anyway..then blame fate. Or B: We dont have free will so it doesnt matter if we fail or succeed, so try as hard as you can since that is clearly what was set for the future anyway.

I'm not totally convinced by the dichotomy, Watchman. If we didn't have free will no one would have any other capacity but to act and think and although folk may believe otherwise, by the dictates of determinism or indeterminism we'd know differently.

In this light, it would imply that no one could be held responsible for their physiological or ontological existence (their physical being and their way of being) and thus it would be morally implausible to hold someone responsible for these traits that were not their fault and due to factors outside their control. Such a stance might be philosophically sound, it may even reduce levels of hate, ethnic wars and the such, but it would be socially irresponsible, for be it true or otherwise, we must be thought of as free from the dictates of determinism and that within everyone of our actions, there was the very real capacity to manipulate our impulses, desires and thoughts, for the purpose that we may be judged and punished.

In this light, if for the sake of argument, science and its disposition towards determinism were true, this would render the social convention of personal responsibility the unavoidable result of a deterministic necessity. The ultimate irony. Free will would be merely a fictitious reproduction of necessity, let's say a process of biological evolution in our case, but is taken to be real in order that our judgments and punishments can adopt the righteous appearance of authenticity. In a play with words, would free will, then, be the cunning liberty of determination?

Of course, in the grand scheme of things such ponderings are meaningless, but it's fun to play around with some of the implications science or otherwise might have

[Watchman]

Im not convinced either to be honest Qualia, however I like to simplify things to a point where as easy a decision as possible can be made. The question is ultimately meaningless though as you say, we don't get to decide if there is free will or not, that is the point. I like to see it as much the same as the question "do we live in a simulated environment inside a computer program?" (and yes there has been a significant amount of thought put into this question by serious people, not just Matrix fans lol) and the answer is - It doesn't matter, we must live as though what we perceive is real, as I have suggested in other threads, perception is reality. We must live assuming what we perceive is real or we would be in serious trouble.

I used to work with a chap with textbook schizophrenia, he truly believed God talked to him, so did the wind and spiders. To him, all this was real. The question should really be "Do I know with absolute certainty that he was wrong?" For him, he had to live as though it was real, from my perspective (for my own welfare) I had to assume it wasn't. Which one of us was correct? And ultimately, does it matter?

[MrFinster]

Hmm, Is that not just a confident intuitive instinctive reaction avoiding the thought process... Still a result of ones past experiences.

If so then it is not a choice but a decision made through subconscious reasoning, 

That doesn't rule out the ability to make an unreasoned choice, but it requires a great deal of introspective observation which is an ability that is not taught to the majority of people in modern times.

[ollypenrice]

The dichotemy I'd like to resolve (but never will!) is this one; if time does not exist in past-present-future order but is an ensemble of some kind, do we have to assume that free will is lost? Quantum theory has thrown up doubts about causality which I tend to interpret as errors in the tensed theory of time (past present future.) But how would free will exist in an 'already assembled' or 'out of tensed time' ensemble?

Olly

[Qualia]

The dichotemy I'd like to resolve (but never will!) is this one; if time does not exist in past-present-future order but is an ensemble of some kind, do we have to assume that free will is lost? ...how would free will exist in an 'already assembled' or 'out of tensed time' ensemble?

Olly

It's a fascinating question, Olly. If time is an ensemble, would it have something to do with Eternalism? The thesis that all moments in time exist, just as much as all points in space exist? If this is so, it may not have a detrimental effect on the thesis of free will. Suppose determinism is true yet is compatible with free will, then it appears that we have free will, regardless of what the ontology or thesis of time is be it eternal, or forever present, etc. But with that said, if enternalism involved notions of fatalism, that the past is fixed and cannot be changed and so by causal determinism the future is already scripted, then it follows (perhaps) that we cannot do anything to change it and hence lack free will.

Thinking about this a little, whatever our theories of time, we could just say what will be, will be and all we're saying here is that the future will be some way, and not some other way. For hardcore fatalism to ring true we'd have to say, what will be will have to be. Now, we could focus just on that 'have to' and conclude that a world of fatalism is bound by necessity. But we've missed out its relation to that subtle 'will'. Now, 'will have to be' is a contigent term, it is conditional, it is not bound by necessity. So whether we exist in a world of eternalism, fatalism or presentism, free will is preserved . Again, contrary to what I wrote above, if determinism is bound to the thesis of causality, we can still presrve free will by adopting Humean Skepticism.

[foundaplanet]

If we truly understood the way the universe is working would we not be able to say that we know what its route will be? Is this route whether we know the answer or not an absolute certainty? If not then would that not imply that the universe itself has freewill? 

If the universe is going to play itself to an inevitable eventual outcome, then as we think it must be following rules and laws, why should those rules and laws be any different for organic matter as everything is playing a part within the same whole....Hmm, no idea really as I suppose what I have just said is that from the moment life first started on earth the way it is now has always been an inevitability. I suppose that is also suggesting that the universe is building itself and likes art..

I best go and do a bit more carving, interesting subject!

[andrew s]

Olly - this is an interesting but complex subject. I think we need to separate out the concept of time as used in our physical theories and our own physiological experience of time.

As far as I am aware all currently testable fundamental physical  theories classical physics, quantum theory, relativity etc. involve the variable  time which is continuous (even in quantum theory) and has a concept of a local now i.e. a point in time at which certain other parameter are say fixed or measured at a point  in space etc. etc. There are theories in which all points in time, like space, exist but we for some reason see time as a flow - I don't understand the leading theory in this area so can't add any more.

We also have a physiological concept of time that roughly aligns the physical time but is very different from it. Our time goes fast and slow we are unaware of it when asleep. What we call the present when we decide or act is not obviously an instant in physical time. Studies have shown, for example, that our brain as already commanded our bodies to act (i.e. nerve impulses sent) before we are consciously aware of it. So at what point was the decision made?

It is very difficult and probably impossible to provide a coherent story linking one level of our understanding of the world to another. For example we are still only now beginning to understand how the classical macro world emerges from the quantum world. There are still significant issues in getting from statistical physics of atoms and molecules to thermodynamics - something the text books fail to point out!. So getting from a physical basis of time to a description of physiological time is not yet available.

One other point, while classical physics is deterministic quantum theory is not. We, as far as I understand it, just don't know if or how the probabilistic nature of quantum theory impacts any free will we may (or may not) have.

Regards Andrew

[MrFinster]

Thinking about this a little, whatever our theories of time, we could just say what will be, will be and all we're saying here is that the future will be some way, and not some other way. For hardcore fatalism to ring true we'd have to say, what will be will have to be. Now, we could focus just on that 'have to' and conclude that a world of fatalism is bound by necessity. But we've missed out its relation to that subtle 'will'. Now, 'will have to be' is a contigent term, it is conditional, it is not bound by necessity. So whether we exist in a world of eternalism, fatalism or presentism, free will is preserved . Again, contrary to what I wrote above, if determinism is bound to the thesis of causality, we can still presrve free will by adopting Humean Skepticism.

To quote a line from a classic sci fi film, "there is no future, only that which we make for ourselves."

That is arguably correct although I would be cautious regarding scepticism as filter to prevent prior reasoning from influencing choices now which may affect possible future events.

[andrew s]

Qualia - I think you can have causality without determinism. For example, quantum measurement have a cause (i.e. you decide to make a measurement) but their outcome is not determined. 

Regards Andrew

[Laurie61]

The dichotemy I'd like to resolve (but never will!) is this one; if time does not exist in past-present-future order but is an ensemble of some kind, do we have to assume that free will is lost? Quantum theory has thrown up doubts about causality which I tend to interpret as errors in the tensed theory of time (past present future.) But how would free will exist in an 'already assembled' or 'out of tensed time' ensemble?

Olly

Perhaps free will is enabled by some knowledge of the future ? allowing us to turn the steering wheel now instead of tomorrow ?

http://noosphere.princeton.edu/

[Treeden]

If past-present-future is not comprehensively true but is only a local-to-us phenomenon, then where does that leave free will? On the face of it it leaves it dead in the water, but what if a wider dimensional matrix than that implied by past-present-future is somehow made up with free will in its recipe?

Olly

I tried to provide a suitable response to this question (in that other thread) but kept deleting it, re-writing and deleting it again it until I gave up. My arguments cancelled themselves out until I had lost confidence in what I believed and had forgotten what I wanted to say. My apologies Olly. I need to read up on this subject and try again!

One of the things I tend to do when I have a mental blockage, is retreat to the place where I find peace and a calming influence, music. This led me back to one of my favourite bands, Rush, and to one track in particular which has always been one of my favourites, and is also the perfect way (for me) to express what I think I was trying to say.

The track is called 'Freewill'  from the album Permanent Waves.

There are those who think that life is nothing left to chance

a host of holy horrors to direct our aimless dance.

A planet of playthings

we dance on the strings

of powers we cannot perceive.

"The stars aren't aligned”

or “The gods are malign"

blame is better to give than receive.

You can choose a ready guide in some celestial voice.

If you choose not to decide, you still have made a choice.

You can choose from phantom fears and kindness that can kill

I will choose a path that's clear

I will choose free will.

There are those who think that they were dealt a losing hand

The cards were stacked against them, they weren't born in Lotus-land.

All preordained

a prisoner in chains

a victim of venomous fate.

Kicked in the face

you can't pray for a place

In heaven's unearthly estate.

You can choose a ready guide in some celestial voice.

If you choose not to decide, you still have made a choice.

You can choose from phantom fears and kindness that can kill

I will choose a path that's clear

I will choose free will.

Each of us

a cell of awareness

imperfect and incomplete.

Genetic blends

with uncertain ends

on a fortune hunt that's far too fleet.

You can choose a ready guide in some celestial voice.

If you choose not to decide, you still have made a choice.

You can choose from phantom fears and kindness that can kill

I will choose a path that's clear

I will choose free will.

[laowho]

Sorry Olly...couldn't resist the thread Q

The first paradox is, "The likeness of unlike things" (Mulcaster), and even physicists don't like paradox (or infinities, but that's their own particular framework bias). So to whether free will is the ruse of determinism, of course it is. How not? To posit anything so dualistically necessarily invokes both aspects/polarities/antipodes, but in this case it may also betray something. I mean, does a fish say water is wet? Probably not. To even have the notion of freedom necessitates that its alternative be present first. Imagine being an aboriginal person who'd never known law, property or confinement, suddenly cast into prison. He'd probably begin to develop a notion of freedom, a thing which couldn't exist before confinement. But at this point we become the ball in a game of Pong, simply and forever being bounced to varying degree b/t these two "things."

As for the arrow of time, if it weren't reversible, then how would they have run the universe's clock backward to a big bang? Think about it...